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Abstract
A solution for compliance proving and emission trading in case of big uncer-
tainties in emission observations is proposed. It is based on the undershooting
concept, from which both mathematical conditions for proving the compliance
with a risk α, and for calculation of effective emissions for trading is obtained.
This notions are used for defining effective permits, which can be traded on a
normal basis, neglecting the underlying uncertainty.
1 Introduction
Uncertainty in the greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories has been estimated to
be in the range 5-20%, depending on the scope and methodology used [9], [5].
Even if some of the computations need unification of assumptions and possibly
recalculation, the uncertainty is still believed to be about 10-12% or more for
most countries [11] and therefore is larger than the reduction commitments.
Thus, the uncertainty seems to become a big problem both in the compliance
proving and in implementation of the flexible mechanisms: emission trading,
joint implementation and clean development mechanism.
Uncertainty varies between parties taking part in the Kyoto agreement.
They also vary considerably between different emission activities. Having this
in mind one can think of better or poorer quality inventories or more or less
credible reduction of the GHG emissions. When dealing with the flexible mech-
anisms, better or poorer quality goods are offered for sale or exchange. Should
they be treated on the equal basis? Without explicit rules of maintaining this
problem it is rather doubtful that it will be solved by the market itself. And
leaving this problem unsolved may undermine credibility of the whole reduction
process, as, in principle, one can always report bigger savings in emissions with
increased uncertainty.
This problem found rather inadequate attention in the literature. Assess-
ments of uncertainty were done and compared for several countries, see e. g. [9],
[3], [4]. Some as far vague considerations on excluding most uncertain activities
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from the emission trading were mentioned [10], [5]. In [1], [2] undershooting as
the basis for proving compliance was proposed. Also the argumentation in this
paper uses undershooting concept as far as the compliance proving is concerned.
We introduce, however, a risk that the real emission may not satisfy the reduc-
tion obligation due to big uncertainty in inventories. This allows us to treat in a
similar way uncertainty of different types, like interval or stochastic one. We also
consider uncertainty in both the commitment and the basic years as contribut-
ing to the overall uncertainty when comparing the involved emission reduction.
To avoid big changes in the reduction level connected with undershooting we
propose to appropriately adjust (shift) the reference obligation levels.
The compliance proving rule proposed in the paper is further a starting point
for reevaluation of the traded units of emissions, taking into account the different
underlying uncertainty. This is done by assuming that the uncertainty of the
traded emissions contributes to the buyer’s overall uncertainty. Big uncertainty
in the sold emissions increases the uncertainty of the buyer’s emission balance
and therefore must be of smaller worth to the buyer.
This idea is transfered to definition of an emission permit in case of uncer-
tainty. The new (effective) emission permit includes uncertainty in the way that
a party with big uncertainty of the inventory is allocated less emission permits
than another party with the same emission and smaller uncertainty. The effec-
tive permits are subject to normal trading, as in the case of permits with exact
knowledge of emissions.
A preliminary proposition of the above solution was presented at the work-
shop held in IIASA [7]. A more elaborated paper was presented at a conference
in Poland [8]. A simplified presentation can be also found in the IIASA Interim
Report [3].
2 Notation and problem formulation
By x(t) we denote the real, unknown emission of a party in the year t. It can
be only estimated, basically through emission inventory. Let xˆ(t) denote the
best available estimate of x(t). This estimate is subject to estimation error
connected with the inventory uncertainty. Mainly interval type uncertainty will
be discussed here, while stochastic type will be only presented in a limited scope.
By δ we denote the fraction of the party emission that is to be reduced in the
commitment year(s) according to obligation. The value of δ may be negative
for parties, which were alloted limitation of the emission increase. Denoting by
tb the basic year and by tc the commitment year the following inequality should
be satisfied to prove the compliance
x(tc)− (1− δ)x(tb) ≤ 0 (1)
The problem arises because neither x(tc) nor x(tb) are known precisely enough.
Instead, only the difference of estimates can be calculated
xˆ(tc)− (1− δ)xˆ(tb)
where both xˆ(tc) and xˆ(tb) are known with intolerable low accuracy.
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3 Compliance proving
Interval type uncertainty. Assuming that the uncertainty intervals at the
basic and the commitment years are ±∆b and ±∆c, respectively, we have
x(tb) ∈ [xˆ(tb)−∆b, xˆ(tb) + ∆b], x(tc) ∈ [xˆ(tc)−∆c, xˆ(tc) + ∆c]
from where, using the interval calculus rules, we get
x(tc)− (1− δ)x(tb) ∈ [Dxˆ−∆bc, Dxˆ + ∆bc]
where Dxˆ = xˆ(tc)− (1− δ)xˆ(tb) and ∆bc = ∆c + (1− δ)∆b.
To be fully credible, that is to be sure that (1) is satisfied even in the worst
case, the party should prove Dxˆ + ∆bc ≤ 0, see Fig. 1. We say that the party
proves the compliance with risk α if Dxˆ + ∆bc ≤ 2α∆bc, see Fig. 1 for the
geometrical interpretation. After simple algebraic manipulations this gives the
condition
xˆ(tc) ≤ (1− δ)xˆ(tb)− (1− 2α)∆bc (2)
To prove the compliance with risk α the party has to undershoot its obligation
with the value (1− 2α)∆bc, dependent on the uncertainty measure ∆bc.
The condition (2) can be also rewritten as
rˆ = xˆ(tc)/xˆ(tb) ≤ 1− δ − (1− 2α)Rbc (3)
where rˆ is the estimated reduction factor and Rbc = ∆bc/xˆ(tb) is the half relative
uncertainty interval with respect to the estimated emission in the basic year
xˆ(tb). To relate the uncertainty to the emission estimate in the commitment
year xˆ(tc) it must be multiplied by the estimated reduction factor rˆ. Analogously
other relative values introduced in the sequel can be transformed.
It is seen from (3) that the compliance with risk α reduces to redefinition of
the reduction factor
δ → δU = δ + (1− 2α)Rbc (4)
-
(b)
(a)
α · 2∆bc
Dxˆ−∆bc Dxˆ 0 Dxˆ + ∆bc
Dxˆ−∆bc Dxˆ Dxˆ + ∆bc
-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1: Full compliance (a) and the compliance with risk α (b) in the interval
uncertainty approach.
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Stochastic type uncertainty. Let us assume now that xˆ(t) is normally dis-
tributed with the mean E[xˆ(t)] = x(t) and variance var[xˆ(t)] = σ2, with obvious
notations σ2b and σ
2
c in the years t = tb and t = tc, respectively. Wider class of
distributions can be considered but it is out of scope of this paper. The variable
xˆ(tc)− (1− δ)xˆ(tb) is then normal with the mean x(tc) − (1 − δ)x(tb) and the
variance
σ2bc = (1− δ)
2σ2b + 2(1− δ)ρbcσbσc + σ
2
c
where ρbc is the correlation coefficient of xˆ(tb) and xˆ(tc).
We require that the probability of noncompliance is not higher than α
P{
(1− δ)xˆ(tb)− xˆ(tc)− (1− δ)x(tb) + x(tc)
σbc
≥ q1−α} ≤ α
where q1−α is the (1− α)th quantile of the standard normal distribution. This
provides the condition
xˆ(tc) ≤ (1− δ)xˆ(tb)− (1− δ)x(tb) + x(tc)− q1−ασbc (5)
If x(tc) > (1− δ)x(tb), then (5) holds when the following is true
xˆ(tc) ≤ (1− δ)xˆ(tb)− q1−α)σbc (6)
If x(tc) < (1− δ)x(tb), then the committed obligation is fulfilled anyway. Thus,
we conclude that fulfillment of (6) is sufficient for proving compliance with risk
α in the stochastic approach. A sketch on Fig. 2 shows analogy of the stochastic
and the interval approaches.
-
α
0Dxˆ
q1−ασbc..................
........
......
.....
......
......
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
......
......
......
............................................................................................................
.
......
.
...............
.
...........
Figure 2: Compliance with risk α in the stochastic approach.
Condition (6) can be also formulated as
rˆ = xˆ(tc)/xˆ(tb) ≤ 1− δ − q1−αRbc
where Rbc = σbc/xˆ(tb). This case is reduced to redefinition of the reduction
factor to δU = δ + q1−αRbc.
4 Adjustment of the basic committed level
A critique of the undershooting concept may be connected with increase of the
reduction caused by additional expression dependent on uncertainty. This way
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more than the agreed 5.2% estimated reduction would occur. This excess reduc-
tion can be simply corrected by appropriately shifting the reference reduction
level. The idea presented here is to compare the uncertainty distributions with
a reference one, which satisfies the original committed obligation and has a cho-
sen uncertainty measure. More specifically, we require that both the reference
distribution and the distribution of a party considered have the same upper
(1− α)th limits of their uncertainty intervals, see Figs. 3 and 4.
- (a)
(b)
(c)
2α∆M
2α∆bc
2α∆bc
DM xˆ−∆M DM xˆ DM xˆ + ∆M
-
DAxˆ−∆bc DAxˆ DAxˆ + ∆bc
-
DAxˆ−∆bc DAxˆ DAxˆ + ∆bc
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3: Adjustment of the committed level in the interval uncertainty ap-
proach, (a) reference model, (b) ∆bc > ∆M , (c) ∆bc < ∆M .
Interval type uncertainty. The reference model distribution has to satisfy
exactly the committed reduction level and therefore its reduction factor is δ.
At its upper limit of the (1 − α)th uncertainty interval it holds xˆ(tc) = (1 −
δ)xˆ(tb) + (1 − 2α)∆M , where ∆M is the chosen parameter – the uncertainty
measure. Similarly, for the same upper limit of the party with the adjusted
committed factor δA we have xˆ(tc) = (1−δA)xˆ(tb)+(1−2α)∆bc. As both these
upper limits have to be equal we get the equation, see also Fig. 3
(1− δA)xˆ(tb) + (1− 2α)∆bc = (1− δ)xˆ(tb) + (1− 2α)∆M
This yields the following relationship for the redefinition of the reduction factor
δ → δA = δ − (1− 2α)(RM −Rbc) (7)
where RM = ∆M/xˆ(tb). The reduction factor δA is smaller than δU and the
difference is
δU − δA = (1− 2α)RM
It can be also reformulated as
δA = δU − (1− 2α)RM = δAU + (1− 2α)Rbc
This expression is analogous to (3). Then, we can also interpret
δAU = δ − (1− 2α)RM
as the shifted δ in the condition (2).
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Stochastic type uncertainty. Likewise, for the stochastic approach we get,
see Fig. 4
(1− δA)xˆ(tb) + q1−ασbc = (1− δ)xˆ(tb) + q1−ασM
where σM is the chosen parameter – the standard deviation of the reference
distribution. Finally
δ → δA = δ − q1−α(RM −Rbc) (8)
where RM = σM/xˆ(tb). And analogously to the interval uncertainty case we
get δAU = δ − q1−αRM as the shifted δ in condition (6).
-
α
0DM xˆ
q1−ασM
(a)
(b)
.....................
.........
......
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.......
...........................................................................................
.....................
-
α
DAxˆ
q1−ασbc.............................
...........
.........
........
.......
.......
........
.........
...................................................................................................................................
Figure 4: Adjustment of the committed level in the stochastic approach: (a)
reference model, (b) σbc > σM .
Choice of RM . An obvious choice of RM is to keep possibly unchanged the
overall reduction level. Several interpretations are, however, possible, even if
only the interval uncertainty is considered, as it is in the sequel. Let us assume
that N parties, i = 1, . . . , N , take part in the Kyoto reduction project. We can
require that mean committed reduction fractions before and after adjustment
are equal, i. e. 1
N
ΣNi=1δ
(i)
A =
1
N
ΣNi=1δ
(i). After inserting for δ
(i)
A from (7) this
may induce two conditions:
(i) with constant RM
RM =
1
N
ΣNi=1R
(i)
bc
(ii) with constant ∆M (similar for σM )
∆M =
ΣNi=1R
(i)
bc
ΣNi=11/xˆ
(i)(tb)
Alternatively, we can require that mean committed reduction quota is constant,
i. e. 1
N
ΣNi=1δ
(i)
A xˆ
(i)(tb) =
1
N
ΣNi=1δ
(i)xˆ(i)(tb). The two resulting conditions are as
follows:
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(iii) with constant RM
RM =
ΣNi=1∆
(i)
bc
ΣNi=1xˆ
(i)(tb)
(iv) with constant ∆M (similar for σM )
∆M =
1
N
ΣNi=1∆
(i)
bc
5 Uncertainties in emission trading
Admitting the above compliance proving policy it is possible to consider uncer-
tainty in emission trading and this way to provide for different quality of this
good. The main idea of this proposition consists in transferring the uncertainty
to the buyer together with the traded quota of emission and including it in the
buyer’s emission balance. Only interval type uncertainty will be considered in
this and the next section. Stochastic uncertainty introduces nonlinearities and
requires longer derivations, see [8]. Moreover, neat extension for the tradable
permits is not obvious for the stochastic case.
Let us consider a selling party, recognized by the superscript S in variables,
with its uncertainty of emission inventory in the commitment year characterized
by ∆Sc or R
S
c = ∆
S
c /xˆ
S(tc). Its unit Eˆ
S of the sold estimated emission brings
with it the uncertainty
EˆSRSc =
EˆS
xˆS(tc)
∆Sc = eˆ
S∆Sc
where eˆS = EˆS/xˆ(tc).
If the buying party, recognized by the superscript B, purchases n units EˆS ,
then its emission balance becomes
xˆB(tc)− nEˆ
S
Its uncertainty, after inclusion of freshly bought one, is
∆Bbc + neˆ
S∆Sc
Before the trade the following compliance-proving-with-risk-α inequality had
to be satisfied
xˆB(tc) + (1− 2α)[∆
B
c + (1− δ
B)∆Bb ] ≤ (1− δ
B)xˆB(tb) (9)
After the trade it changes to
xˆB(tc)− nEˆ
S + (1− 2α)[∆Bc + neˆ
S∆Sc + (1− δ
B)∆Bb ≤ (1− δ
B)xˆB(tb) (10)
Comparing (9) and (10) it is seen that they differ in the following component,
which will be called the effective traded emission
nEeff = nEˆ
S − n(1− 2α)eˆS∆Sc = nEˆ
S [1− (1− 2α)RSc ]
The effective reduction in the buyer balance from one purchased unit EˆS is
Eeff = Eˆ
S [1− (1− 2α)RSc ] (11)
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Thus, the bigger the seller’s uncertainty is the less the purchased unit counts
for the buyer.
Note that the efficient emission is directly subtracted from the buyer emission
inventory, neglecting any uncertainty considerations.
6 Tradable permits under uncertainty
Usual instruments applied for limitation of a pollutant emission are tradable
emission permits. The theory of the tradable permits has been elaborated for
exactly known emissions [6]. With big uncertainties, like in the GHG case, the
efficient emission units introduced in the previous section may be used as the
units of tradable permits. That is, one unit U of the effective tradable permit is
calculated as
U = Eˆ[1− (1− 2α)R] (12)
where Eˆ is the unit of estimated emission. Other way round, the emission xˆ(t)
is equivalent to xˆ(t)[1− (1− 2α)R] units of the effective tradable permits.
According to condition (2), in the commitment year a party has permission
to emit xˆ(tc) units of GHG satisfying
xˆ(tc) ≤ (1− δ)xˆ(tb)− (1− 2α)∆bc = (1− δ)[1− (1− 2α)Rb]xˆ(tb)− (1− 2α)∆c
Adding to both sides (1 − 2α)∆c and denoting, according to (12), l(t) = [1 −
(1− 2α)R]xˆ(t) – the number of the effective permits equivalent to the emission
xˆ(t), with t = tc, R = Rc = ∆c/xˆ(tc) or t = tb, R = Rb = ∆b/xˆ(tb), yields
1 + (1− 2α)Rc
1− (1− 2α)Rc
l(tc) ≤ (1− δ)l(tb)
As for the usual Rc it holds (1− 2α)Rc  1, then
l(tc) ≤ (1− δ)
1− (1− 2α)Rc
1 + (1− 2α)Rc
l(tb) ≈ [1− δ − 2(1− 2α)Rc]l(tb) (13)
So, (13) expresses commitment condition in the effective tradable permits. After
approximation, it has the same form as the original commitment condition in
estimated emission. But the reduced fraction of the effective tradable permits
is increased with an additional component associated with uncertainty and is
now
δ → δp = δ + 2(1− 2α)Rc
To include adjustment of the basic committed level of Sec. 4, the reduction
factor δ in (2) has to be changed to δAU = δ − (1 − 2α)RM . Then, arguing as
above, after some algebraic manipulation (2) can be transformed to
l(tc) ≤
1− (1− 2α)Rc
1 + (1− 2α)Rc
[(1− δ)l(tb) + (1− 2α)RM xˆ(tb)] ≈
≈ [1− δ − 2(1− 2α)Rc]l(tb) +
(1− 2α)RM
1 + (1− 2α)Rc
[1− (1− 2α)Rc]xˆ(tb)
As (1− 2α)RM/[1 + (1− 2α)Rc] ≈ (1− 2α)RM , then approximately we get
l(tc) ≤ [1− δ − (1− 2α)(2Rc −RM )]l(tb) + (1− 2α)
2RM (Rb −Rc)xˆ(tb)
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Finally, noticing that
(1− 2α)2RM (Rb −Rc)xˆ(tb)
[1− δ − (1− 2α)(2Rc −RM )][1− (1− 2α)Rb]xˆ(tb)
 1
we have an approximate condition
l(tc) ≤ [1− δ − (1− 2α)(2Rc −RM )]l(tb)
This provides the reduction fraction for permits (with adjustment)
δ → δpA = δ + (1− 2α)(2Rc −RM )
Thus, the compliance proving and trading mechanism with the uncertain
observations and adjustment of the basic committed level requires the following
steps. At a (successive) basic year the allotted estimated emissions are converted
to the effective permits according to the expression
l(tb) = xˆ(tb)[1− (1− 2α)Rb] (14)
The committed obligations, in effective permits, in the commitment year are
calculated from the condition
l(tc) ≤ (1− δpA)l(tb) = [1− δ − (1− 2α)(2Rc −RM )]l(tb) (15)
which is equivalent to the estimated emission
xˆ(tc) =
l(tc)
1− (1− 2α)Rc
≈ l(tc)[1 + (1− 2α)Rc] (16)
The effective permits l(tc) can be traded and directly added to the effective
permits of any party taking part in the project.
Let us notice that if Rbc = 2Rc and RM = Rbc, i.e. uncertainty of the party
equals the reference one, then RM = 2Rc and therefore δpA = δ. In this case
(15) reduces to the condition l(tc) ≤ (1− δ)l(tb) where the reduction fraction is
equal to the original one.
The above scheme reduces the trade in the uncertain case to the classical
tradable permits problem. The effective permits are traded and counted without
explicit consideration of the uncertainties in the emission inventories.
7 Conclusions
The above reasoning can be readily extended to the case when uncertainty of
different emission actions can be considered in trading. Then, the separate
uncertainty measures Rc connected with different activities could be used for
determining the number of the effective tradable permits.
The idea can also be applied to other flexible mechanisms, provided the
respective uncertainty measures are known for them.
The presented approach of including uncertainty in the value of emissions
can solve the problem of different qualities of emission inventories in emission
compliance proving and emission trading. Its application requires additional
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negotiations and agreements between parties participating in the emission re-
duction project. The most difficult points in negotiations might be changes of
committed reductions, although they may be not so big when the adjustment
of the committed reduction levels is done. Some free parameters may help to
find the most convenient solution.
The advantage of the presented approach is in complete treatment of the
uncertainty problem and its reduction to known case of exact observations.
To apply it the knowledge of uncertainty estimates of inventories or particular
activities for all parties involved is required.
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